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We impose a horizontal equity restriction on the problem of finding the optimal utilitarian tax 
mix. The horizontal equity constraint requires that individuals with the same ability have to 
pay the same amount of taxes regardless of their preferences for leisure. Contrary to normal 
findings, we find that a good that is complementary to leisure need not be discouraged by the 
tax system, and that a good that normally should be discouraged by the tax system need not be 
taxed at a positive rate even if the economy is composed of only two private commodities 
plus leisure. Similarly, the marginal effective tax rate need not be equal to zero at the top 
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A well-known problem with income taxes is that they punish hard-working people. Nozick
(1974) for example asks why somebody who prefers looking at the sunset should pay less
taxes than somebody who has to earn money in order to attain his pleasures. This question
is not only important on its own normative ground, but also because tax systems that violate
general conceptions of equity will be replaced if enough citizens call them into question.
As a matter of fact, such questions of equity have to a large extent been neglected in the
optimal taxation literature, where one of the standard assumptions is that all individuals
share the same preferences.1 At the same time, philosophers and social choice scholars
have been investigating redistributive schemes where individuals are held responsible for
certain inequalities.2 In particular, it is often advocated that an individual ought to bear
the consequences of the characteristics which he has chosen himself. This line of reasoning,
which originates from Dworkin (1981a, b), is especially relevant for optimal income taxation
if the utility of leisure is heterogeneous across individuals. In such case, the government may
n o tw a n tt oc o m p e n s a t ep e o p l ef o ri n c o m ed i ﬀerences that are due to diﬀerences in tastes.
H o w e v e r ,s i n c ei ti sg e n e r a l l ya s s u m e dt h a tt h eg o v e r n m e n tc a no n l yo b s e r v et h ei n c o m eo fa n
individual, it is impossible to ﬁnd an income tax scheme that only compensates for diﬀerences
in abilities. Indeed, in the public debate it is frequently pointed out that transfers to hard-
working low-skilled persons are also beneﬁting more highly skilled but also more epicurean
individuals. In the eyes of the government, they are alike since their pre-tax incomes are
similar. We investigate if and how the government can use the tax instruments typically
1 Possible exceptions are provided by Cuﬀ (2000) and Boadway et al. (2002) for the ﬁnite case, while
Tarkiainen and Tuomala (1999) develop a computational approach to tackle the problem of two-dimensional
population in the continuous case. All the quoted authors neglect the problem of the optimal structure
of commodity taxation and work with models where leisure is additive separable from other consumption
goods. Sandmo (1993) examines the utilitarian case for a linear income tax under the assumption that
diﬀerences in earnings are explained by diﬀerences in preferences over work and consumption; he also has
a brief section in which both market abilities and preferences for leisure are allowed to vary. Ebert (1988)
provides conditions on preference orderings and utility functions which allow us to transform the problem
of optimal (utilitarian) income taxation for a two-dimensional population into a one-dimensional problem.
2 See Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2002) for a review.
2observed in developed countries–linear commodity taxes and a non-linear income tax–to
escape this dilemma.
Related to the principle of responsibility for certain inequalities is the horizontal equity
principle of equal treatment of equals. Indeed, an interpretation of the horizontal equity
principle is that if two individuals diﬀer only in tastes, then the government ought to treat
them identically. The literature contains several suggestions of the status and deﬁnition of
horizontal equity.3 Musgrave (1959) argues that in the ability-to-pay approach to taxation,
“horizontal and vertical equity are but diﬀerent sides of the same coin.” However, there are
several reasons for taxing people with the same ability diﬀerently. Besides the conﬂicts arising
from the government’s lack of information, Stiglitz (1982) demonstrates that the horizontal
equity requirement does not follow from the maximization of a traditional utilitarian or
more general social welfare function (which does not consider relations between individual
outcomes), and, more strongly, that it may also be inconsistent with Pareto optimality. In
a recent contribution, Kaplow and Shavell (2001b) prove formally that any non-welfarist
method of policy assessment,4 such as the concern for horizontal equity, violates the Pareto
principle.
In view of this expected conﬂict between horizontal and vertical equity, it is often argued
that the former should take precedence over the lat t e r .I nl i n ew i t ht h i s ,A t k i n s o na n dS t i g l i t z
(1976, 1980) suggest the imposition of a horizontal equity constraint on the maximization
3 The relevance of this concept has recently been questioned in a series of articles by Kaplow (1989, 1995,
2000) and Kaplow and Shavell (2000, 2001a), where it is claimed that usually provided indices of deviations
from horizontal equity are developed without knowing what they should try to measure and why, but are
merely stipulated or supported by ad hoc appeals to intuition. Moreover, Kaplow refers to and seems to
share Westen’s (1982) view, according to which “Equality will cease to mistify–and cease to skew moral and
political discourse–when people come to realize that it is an empty form having no substantive content of its
own. (...) The endurance of the principle of equality–that likes should be treated alike–is due to the fact
that it is empty of content. For the principle to have meaning, it must incorporate some external values, but
once these external values are found, the principle of equality is superﬂuous.” According to these authors,
to pay attention to the unequal treatment of equals can be useful at most from a practical perspective. Even
though the measures oﬀered by horizontal equity indices are not of independent normative signiﬁcance, they
can be useful in order to alert about circumstances in which something is amiss and social welfare, as the
notion is conventionally understood, is reduced.
4 The term “non-welfarist” refers to any conception of social welfare that gives weight to factors other
than the satisfaction of the individuals’ preferences.
3of a social welfare function.5 Feldstein (1976) instead suggests to balance the fulﬁlment
of horizontal equity against the utilitarian principle of welfare maximization. Regarding
the deﬁnition of horizontal equity, the proposed measures are as a rule either based on tax
payments or on utilities. Still Johnson and Mayer (1962) emphasize the number of inequities,
though this measure could be weighted by the corresponding diﬀerences in tax payments.
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976, 1980) refer to Pigou, who observed that persons with diﬀerent
tastes who pay the same amount of taxes will not necessarily suﬀer equal burdens in terms of
foregone utility. Thus they argue that commodity taxes should be set to maintain the parity
of utilities for persons who, according to the government’s value judgments, attained equal
utility before the imposition of taxes. Feldstein (1976) on his part proposes measures based
on actual utilities as experienced by the individuals. His measures include the after-tax
variance of utilities for people who attained equal utilities before taxes were levied. Plotnick
(1981) compares “preordered” and standard Lorenz curves and derives an index which is
sensitive to the magnitude of the changes in income rankings produced by redistribution.
Auerbach and Hassett (1999) propose a new income-based measure, suitable for applied
work. Their idea is to incorporate horizontal equity in a social welfare function by weighting
each inequity between two groups by the distance (e.g. in pre-tax income) between the
groups in a way that has been used in the econometric literature on kernel density functions.
Other articulations of the concept of horizontal equity include Rosen (1978), King (1983),
Berliant and Strauss (1985), and Balcer and Sadka (1986).
In this paper we stay close in spirit to the interpretation of the concept given by Bossert
(1995) in terms of “equal transfers for equal circumstances”,6 and require that individuals of
the same ability must pay the same amount of taxes irrespective of their preferences.7 This
5 Actually, as recognized by Kaplow (1989), this approach helps avoiding at least some of the objections
related to the concept of horizontal equity.
6 This terminology comes from the division of the sources of individual outcomes into wills, resources
and circumstances. According to this division, the individual is responsible for his wills, whereas the cir-
cumstances are factors outside his control. Diﬀerences in circumstances can be compensated by reallocating
the resources.
7 A similar argument was put forward by Allingham (1974) who also recognizes that the idea that taxation
4can be justiﬁe db yt h eo b s e r v a t i o nt h a tp e o p l ew i t ht h es a m ea b i l i t ys h a r et h es a m eo p p o r -
tunity set, and while diﬀerences in this set can in some moral sense be deemed “irrelevant”
and therefore call for compensation, diﬀerences in preferences may be regarded as morally
“relevant”, suggesting that compensation is ruled out for such diﬀerences. According to this
reasoning the individuals are fully responsible for their preferences.
Our approach is to introduce the principle of equal transfers for equal circumstances as a
constraint on the maximization of a utilitarian social welfare function. Although we have to
admit that the choice of a tax-based rather than a utility-based measure is to some extent
arbitrary, it is simple and also suﬃcient for focusing on the moral diﬃculties raised by the
fact that the government can only observe income diﬀerences and not diﬀerences in abilities
or preferences.8
We ﬁnd that the imposition of the horizontal equity requirement modiﬁes the rule for
optimal commodity taxes. Contrary to normal ﬁndings a good that is complementary to
leisure need not be discouraged by the tax system, and perhaps more peculiar, a good that
should be discouraged by the tax system in the absence of the horizontal equity condition
need not be taxed at a positive rate once this condition is imposed, even if the economy is
composed by only two private commodities plus leisure.9 In essence the trade-oﬀ between
the eﬀects on revenue from the commodity tax and the desire to encourage individuals to
reveal their true characteristics is amended by the requirement to uphold horizontal equity.
When this requirement is taken into account the popular prescription to loosen the incentive
compatibility constraint by taxing goods that are complementary to leisure is only one
part of the story. We also derive eﬀective marginal tax rates for individuals with diﬀerent
should be just in the sense of depending on ability (but not on preferences) may be traced at least as far
back as Guicciardini and Bodin in the sixteenth century.
8 The policies analysed in this paper diﬀer in two important respects from policies that can be derived
from conceptions of justice based on equality of opportunity. In contrast to what is suggested by Roemer
(1998, 2002) the government in our model does not seek to equalize outcomes for comparable people with
diﬀerent abilities.
9 It is easy to show that in the standard optimal taxation problem with two private commodities plus
leisure, where the indirect tax structure collapses to the deﬁnition of only one commodity tax rate, the
concept of discouragement (encouragement) becomes the same as “being taxed at a positive rate” (“being
subsidized”).
5characteristics and compare them with the tax rates derived in ordinary optimal taxation
models. Also in this case we ﬁnd that ordinary prescriptions have to be amended in order to
satisfy the horizontal equity principle; particularly interesting, the popular result of having
no distortion at the top (of the skill distribution) can be violated.
2 The Model
In our model economy there are three goods (two private consumption goods c and z plus
leisure), and three types of individuals. The individuals are characterized by their skill or
ability (wH or wL)( r e ﬂected, by assumption of perfect competition, in the unitary wage rate
they are paid) and by their taste for leisure (αH or αL), where superscript H (L) denotes a
high (low) ability or taste for leisure. There are π1 low skilled, low taste for leisure individuals
(type 1 with wL and αL), π2 high skilled, high taste for leisure individuals (type 2 with wH
and αH), and π3 high skilled, low taste for leisure individuals (type 3 with wH and αL).
Preferences are represented by the utility function u(c,z,αil),w h e r eαi is the particular
preference parameter of an individual of type i and l is the supply of labor.
Production is linear and uses labor as the only input; units are chosen to make all pro-
ducer prices equal to one, good z is chosen as numéraire and is set untaxed, so that consumer
prices are represented by the vector (1 + t,1) = (q,1). In addition to the commodity tax,
t, the individuals also have to pay a non-linear tax T (Y ) on income Y .T h u s d i s p o s a b l e
income B equals Y − T (Y ) and the total tax liability amounts to τ (Y )=T (Y )+tc.B y
using the relation Y





, where the super-
script on the indirect utility function is for notational convenience only (all types share the




¢(i) will denote the ratio of the preference parame-
ter to the productivity parameter for the representative individual of type i. The indirect
utility function has the following properties: Vq < 0, VB > 0, V3 < 0 (the subscripts denote









| qc+ z = B
ª
; optimizing agents will then maximize their own V (q,B,Y,w,α) subject
to the link between pre-tax earnings and post-tax earnings available for goods expenditure implied by the
direct tax schedule.
6partial derivatives; in particular, V3 denotes the partial derivative with respect to the third
argument). In order to satisfy the single-crossing condition (indiﬀerence curves cross only
once), we will also assume V33 < 0 (labor is annoying at increasing rates) and VB3 < 0 (an
increase in private consumption is valued more, the less “experienced hours” (αl)t h ep e r s o n
is working, i.e. normality of private consumption and “experienced” leisure).
To establish that single crossing holds, we will calculate the slopes of the indiﬀerence
curves in (pre-tax income, disposable income)-space, henceforth referred to as (Y ,B)-space,
of the three types. The slope of such an indiﬀerence curve is given by
∂B
∂Y





















It turns out that the slopes of the indiﬀerence curves can be ranked according to the
ratio of the preference parameter α to ability w. Comparing two types i and j,t h es l o p eo f















































Since, at every (Y ,B)-bundle, the type speciﬁcr a t i oα
w determines the slope of the indiﬀerence
curve for each type of individual, the indiﬀerence curves of two individuals of diﬀerent types
can cross only once.
2.1 A Comparison with Related Models
Compared with the related models developed by Cuﬀ (2000) and Boadway et al. (2002), the
distinguishing feature of our model is the introduction of an additional, taxable commodity.
Cuﬀ uses a model with three types of individuals and a two goods economy (private con-
sumption plus leisure), where high skilled individuals have low taste for leisure, while there
are low skilled individuals with both high and low taste for leisure. In order to make the
7results comparable to those of Besley and Coate (1992, 1995), she uses individual utility
functions that are aﬃne in consumption.
Boadway et al. (2002) instead use a model with four types of individuals (and the
same two goods economy), in which low skilled individuals with low taste for leisure are
indiscernible from the new type of high skilled individuals with high taste for leisure. The
individuals’ utility functions are quasi-linear, but in their case aﬃne in labor. More pre-
cisely, they assume U = u(z) − αil,a n dαL
wL = αH
wH. Thus the “intermediate” types are
indistinguishable because they share the same map of indiﬀerence curves in (Y ,B)-space.
Dealing with a two goods model (consumption and leisure), the quoted papers are con-
ﬁned to studying the shape of the optimal income tax schedule and cannot examine the
potential role of commodity taxation. Notice however that if αL
wL = αH
wH commodity taxes
could not be employed in order to screen between low skilled, low taste for leisure individ-
uals and high skilled, high taste for leisure ones even if individual utility functions are not
separable between leisure and other goods.
Suppose now, as in our model, that we have an economy composed of three goods (two
private consumption goods c and z plus leisure), where there are three types of individuals:
type 1 with low ability and low taste for leisure, type 2 with high ability and high taste for
leisure, and type 3 with high ability and low taste for leisure. Suppose also, as in Boadway
et al. (2002), that type 1 and type 2 are indiscernible because αL
wL = αH
wH,a n dt h a tt h e y
share the same map of indiﬀerence curves in (Y ,B)-space. Finally, assume as we proposed
in the introduction, that the concern for horizontal equity (hereafter HE) translates into
the requirement that the total tax liability of individuals of type 2 and type 3 must be the
same, and that the social planner maximizes a utilitarian social welfare function subject to
the self-selection constraints (stating that no individual would gain by masquerading as an
individual of a diﬀerent type), and a budget-balance constraint. In this situation we can
have two cases, depending on whether taxation is merely redistributive or if the government
has an exogenous amount of expenditure to ﬁnance. In the former case the solution involves
no taxation at all and the optimal outcome is the laissez-faire one. This is due to the fact
8that, since there is necessarily bunching11 between type 1 and type 2, the HE requirement
τ2 = τ3 i m p l i e st h a tw em u s th a v eτ1 = τ2 = τ3. Everybody must pay the same amount
of taxes and, since there is no public expenditure to ﬁnance, no taxation is involved. In the
latter case, suppose that the government has to collect a ﬁxed amount of revenue. Following
the same reasoning as before, each type of individuals must pay the same amount of taxes.
Since income and commodity taxation are distortive and cause deadweight losses, the optimal
policy is a uniform lump sum tax without any excess burden.
As we mentioned above, Boadway et al. (2002) are concerned with the limit situation
where high skilled individuals with high taste for leisure cannot be distinguished from low



















T h i sm e a n st h a ta te v e r yp o i n ti n( Y ,B)-space, the slope of the indiﬀerence curve of a
low skilled, hard working individual is shallower than the one of a high skilled, epicurean
individual, and that for this pair of individuals the ordinary ranking of the indiﬀerence curves
based on their slopes is reversed.
If instead assumption 2 holds, the chain of inequalities is the following:
11 According to Weymark (1986), bunching is said to occur if individuals with diﬀerent characteristics
receive the same commodity bundle. In fact as long as αL
wL = αH
wH , individuals of type 1 and of type 2 will
not only receive the same bundle in (Y ,B)-space, but they will also spend their disposable income across








This case reﬂects more closely the standard one since there is no individual with high abil-
ity that has indiﬀerence curves in (Y ,B)-space that are steeper than the ones of the low
skilled individuals. The ordinary ranking of the indiﬀerence curves that one gets in a one-
dimensional model persists. Since some of the mechanisms in the model are only present
under assumption 2, and also since this assumption is perhaps more realistic, we will only
present the solution of the model under this assumption. This omission of assumption 1
saves space without impairing the reader’s understanding of the model because the results
under the two assumptions are very similar.
2.2 Some Considerations about the Pattern of the Binding Self-
selection Constraints
In conventional optimal taxation models, the inability to observe the types of the individuals
raises a familiar problem. The government may wish to redistribute resources from high
skilled to low skilled individuals (since utility normally increases with the wage rate). Not
knowing who is who, however, all it can do is to tax higher incomes more heavily than
lower incomes. This may create an incentive for a high skilled individual to reduce his labor
supply and earn the same gross income as a low skilled individual. Thus, having imposed the
single crossing condition, the binding self-selection constraint that thwarts the government
in its attempts to redistribute among individuals runs downwards from high skilled (high
earning) individuals towards low skilled (low earning) ones. In a ﬁnite-class economy this
is generalized by saying that an optimal allocation results in a simple monotonic chain to
the left (Guesnerie and Seade, 1982), which means that each pair of successive bundles are
L-linked12 by a downwards binding incentive-compatibility constraint. However, as long as
12 Using the terminology of Guesnerie and Seade (1982), a corner (or chosen bundle) is linked to another
if they both belong to the optimal set of some individual h; or equivalently if there is an indiﬀerence curve
of h which passes through both corners and is the highest h can reach on his budget set. Individual h is said
to link these corners. A corner Ci is W-linked (W for winner) if some h links Ci to some other corner Cj,
and is allocated Ci. A corner Ci is L-linked (L for loser) if some h links Ci to Cj, and is allocated Cj.
10individuals diﬀer both according to their market ability and according to their preferences for
leisure, this is no longer necessarily true even if (as in our case) the single crossing condition
still holds. We cannot tell ap r i o r iwhich one of the pair of self-selection constraints that is
going to be binding. Under certain circumstances, both constraints could even be binding at
the same time (generating what Brito et al. (1990) call a “self-selection cycle”). Notice that
the mentioned properties are a common feature of all models that introduce heterogeneity
along more than one dimension (see Balestrino, Cigno, and Pettini, 1999, 2002; Cremer,
Pestieau, and Rochet, 2001). Finally, notice also that although the single crossing condition
holds in our model, it will not generally do so in models with more than one diﬀerentiating
characteristic of the individuals.
3T h e O p t i m a l T a x M i x
In this section we will solve the model for the optimal tax mix13 for a utilitarian planner
under the case where the “ordinary” ranking holds14 (i.e. assumption 2 in the previous
section). In order to untangle the diﬀerent mechanisms in the model we will ﬁrst present
the results that we obtain without imposing the HE constraint. Then we go on to present
the results of the full model including this constraint.
3.1 Without the Horizontal Equity Constraint
Without the HE constraint the planner’s problem is the following:
max

































13 In accordance with standard practice in the optimal taxation literature, we will simply assume that a
solution exists and characterize the optimal tax mix conditional on this assumption.
14 The same procedure can also be followed to deal with the case where the ranking is transposed.



































































where a “hat” above the function V i indicates that the indirect utility is evaluated at a point
where type i is mimicking another type and we follow the convention to denote by d V j(i),t h e
indirect utility of an individual of type j trying to masquerade as an individual of type
i. The subscripts on the Lagrange multipliers indicate the type of the potential mimicker,
and the superscripts indicate the direction of the incentive compatibility constraint: “u”
for upwards and “d” for downwards (according to the ranking given by the slopes of the
indiﬀerence curves). Since single crossing holds, we only need to take the self-selection
constraints linking pairs of adjacent individuals into account.
Due to the way we have chosen to represent heterogeneity in tastes, the model can also
be interpreted as one with three types of agents, all with the same utility function but with
three diﬀerent market abilities, reﬂected in the unitary competitive wage they are paid. Since
our utilitarian solution belongs to the family of Pareto eﬃcient solutions with redistribution
from high- to low-skilled agents, it must share the properties of the more general solutions
found in the papers by Guesnerie and Seade (1982) and Edwards et al. (1994).
15 We are assuming that taxation serves a merely redistributive purpose.
16 In shaping the self-selection constraints we are implicitly exploiting the circumstance that the utilitarian
solution belongs to the family of “normal cases”, i.e. entails redistribution from high- to low skilled agents.
123.1.1 The Indirect Tax Structure
By applying Roy’s identity, making use of the ﬁrst order conditions for B1, B2,a n dB3,a n d




































Notice that in eq. (4) the term A inside brackets (which is referred to types of agents
that are both high skilled) is non-zero as long as ci
3, the derivative of the demand of agents of
type i for commodity c with respect to the third argument in the individual utility function,
is diﬀerent from zero. On the other hand, c3 6=0simply means that the consumption of the
taxed commodity is positively related to labor (if c3 > 0) or negatively related to labor (if
c3 < 0).
Without the HE constraint the sign of the right hand side of eq. (4), and therefore of
t,i sd e t e r m i n e do n c et h er e l a t i o nb e t w e e nt h et a x e dc o m m o d i t ya n dl e i s u r ei sk n o w n .T h i s
will be discussed in detail after we have introduced the HE restriction.
3.1.2 The Marginal Eﬀective Tax Rates
Now consider the marginal eﬀe c t i v et a xr a t e( M E T R ) .S i n c et h e r ea r eo n l yt w oc o m m o d i t i e s
























As usual we can derive an expression for the marginal income tax rate faced by an
individual by considering his optimal choice of labor supply. The ﬁrst order conditions of































As expected, the METR turns out to be positive for individuals of type 1 and of type 2, but
zero for individuals of type 3. This is shown formally in Appendix B.
3.2 With the Horizontal Equity Constraint
Since we have deﬁned HE as a requirement that individuals of the same skill type should











i.e. that total taxes paid by an individual of type 2 equal total taxes paid by an individual







































































































































































where we have substituted the HE constraint into the indirect utility function of type 3
individuals.
Notice that the way we have chosen to incorporate the constraint (9) implies that every
variation in B2, B3, Y 2 and t must be accompanied by a proper variation in Y 3, the pre-tax
income of type 3 individuals, in order to match the HE requirement. By diﬀerentiating the












































17 Since single crossing holds, we only need to take the self selection constraints linking pairs of adjacent
individuals into account.
153.2.1 The Indirect Tax Structure
Next we will derive the formula for the commodity tax rate that maximizes the planner’s
problem. Equations (11)—(14) are used when deriving the commodity tax rule. The ﬁrst
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If we consider the “normal” case when redistribution goes from high- to low skilled
individuals we are able to show that an optimum is not compatible with the Lagrange
multiplier λ
u
1 being diﬀerent from zero. The argument proceeds along the same lines as in
Proposition 1 in Brito et al. (1990), which states that at any eﬃcient allocation, individuals
of one type will always view the bundles of individuals of other types who have a larger total
tax liability as strictly inferior to their own. To show that a similar result holds also in our
model, suppose that there is a solution to the planner’s problem such that the constraint λ
u
1
is binding. Then the planner could improve upon the suggested allocation by simply letting
the low skilled agents reach the point intended for those whom they are willing to mimic.
Since redistribution is assumed to go from high- to low skilled individuals, this would imply
that the low skilled agents would switch from a bundle where the total tax liability is negative
(they are net receivers) to a bundle where it is positive. Leaving the value of the maximand of
the planner’s problem unaﬀected (since the low skilled agents were supposed to be indiﬀerent
between the two points), such a switch would be socially desirable since it weakens the budget
16constraint of the planner while not tightening the incentive-compatibility constraints. Notice
in particular that we couldn’t have invoked something similar to Proposition 1 by Brito et
al. (1990) if the imposition of the additional (HE) constraint to the standard problem of
a utilitarian planner had reversed the direction of redistribution among agents. But it is
easy to see that this can never happen since then, in a purely redistributive context, the
objective to maximize the sum of utilities of diﬀerent agents would be better achieved by an
optimal tax policy involving no taxation at all (laissez-faire outcome). The nature of what
we called the HE requirement does not change the circumstance that, with a utilitarian
objective function, if some kind of ﬁscal policy is in place, then low skilled agents pay a
strictly lower amount of taxes than high skilled ones.
On the other hand it is not possible to avoid taking the other self selection constraints into
account. In particular, and contrary to what would have happened hadn’t we imposed the
HE restriction, we cannot disregard the constraint λ
u
2. This is because individuals belonging
to type 2 and 3 are adjacent and since we require they should pay the same total tax liability,
it is possible that either of them would like to mimic the other type. Notice however that
the HE constraint (9) rules out bunching of these two types of high skilled individuals. In
fact, bunching would mean that they earn the same gross income and have the same income
tax liability but, in order to pay the same total taxes, it would be necessary that they also
pay the same amount of commodity taxes and this could happen only in the special case





be binding at the same time.
By applying Roy’s identity, making use of the ﬁrst order conditions for B1, B2 and B3





















































































2 − d c3(2)
´
. (16)
Let’s try to explain the diﬀerence between our eq. (16) and the structure one usually gets
when deriving optimal rules for commodity taxation, i.e. eq. (4). Basically, the only
diﬀerences between eq. (16) and eq. (4) are found on the left-hand sides.18 The standard
formula for optimal commodity taxation (in a framework where it supplements a non-linear
income tax schedule) balances the gains of weakening the self-selection constraints against
the eﬀects on revenue from a marginal increase in the commodity tax rate, whilst the revenue
eﬀect is evaluated only indirectly through the change in the pattern of hicksian commodity
demand since the marginal increase in the tax rate is performed in a compensated way.
Having this in mind it becomes easy to interpret eq. (16). Inside the square brackets, π3 ∂ e c2
∂q
replaces π3 ∂ e c3
∂q since the variables referring to individuals of type 3 are replaced by the HE
constraint in the government’s budget constraint.
The second term on the left-hand side of eq. (16) measures the impact of the compensated
increase in the commodity tax rate on the indirect utility of individuals of type 3. The
impact is socially evaluated, i.e. weighted by the numerosity of type 3 individuals, and
the magnitude of the Lagrange multiplier of the constraint that prevents individuals of this
type from mimicking individuals of type 2. Moreover, the impact diﬀers from zero since the
substitution of the HE constraint into the social objective function implies adjustments in the
gross income of the high skilled and hard working type 3 individuals to accommodate every
variation in one of the variables entering the indirect utility function of the high skilled and
more epicurean type 2 individuals. The last term on the left-hand side of eq. (16) provides
an evaluation of the eﬀect generated by a compensated increase in t in terms of weakening (or
tightening) the (eventually) binding incentive-compatibility constraint requiring that agents
of type 2 are not tempted to mimic agents of type 3.
It should be clear that the last two terms on the left-hand side of eq. (16) appear as a
18 Actually, the diﬀerence between the right-hand sides of eq. (16) and (4) also concerns the pattern of





3 in (16) cannot be binding at the same time).
18consequence of the HE requirement. The intuition is that when we perform the “standard”
experiment of marginally increasing by dq the commodity tax rate while at the same time
reducing by dTi = −cidq < 0, i =1 ,2,3 the income tax liabilities of the three types of
individuals at their original earnings (i.e. in a compensated way), the need to meet the HE
constraint requires adjustments in the gross income of individuals of type 3 that make the
reform non-neutral for their welfare. The “residual” net eﬀect on their welfare is given by
















dq (see eq. (20)). However, this “residual” does not
only aﬀect the welfare of the high skilled, low taste for leisure individuals, but will also
have an impact on the welfare that individuals belonging to diﬀerent types would obtain by
mimicking individuals of type 3. This is relevant since in principle nothing prevents that
high skilled, high taste for leisure individuals can like to hide their true type and select the
bundle intended for the high skilled, low taste for leisure ones. Therefore, if the Lagrange
multiplier λ
u
2 is diﬀerent from zero, the described tax change aﬀects the indirect utility of
an individual of type 2 who is mimicking an individual of type 3 not only by the standard





c3 − d c2(3)
´
), but also by the adjustment of the mimickers income that is required to

















The just mentioned intuitive explanation can be analytically restated in the following
way. Consider the eﬀects of a small increase dq in the tax rate on commodity c accompanied
by reductions dT i = −cidq < 0, i =1 ,2,3, in the income tax liabilities of the three types of
individuals at their original earnings. This reform has no eﬀect on the welfare of individuals


















dq =0 ,i =1 ,2. (17)
Now look at the impact of this “compensated” reform on the welfare of the individuals

















































































































We can refer to (20) as to the non-sterilized eﬀect on utility of a compensated (in the
standard meaning of the term) increase in the commodity tax rate that arises because of the
requirement to uphold the HE constraint. In order to evaluate how the indirect utility of an
a g e n to ft y p et w ow h om i m i c sa na g e n to ft y p e3i sa ﬀected by a compensated increase in t,
we must also consider the quantity


















which is related to the change in labor supply needed to pick up the point intended for agents
of type 3.
Denoting by df V 3 and d
] [ V 2(3) (where the “tildes” help to remember that the eﬀects are
produced by “compensated” marginal variations in the commodity tax rate) the quantities
dV 3
dq and d\ V 2(3)
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u
2d





























2 − d c3(2)
´
. (22)
In order to further clarify the mechanisms at work, consider the case where the constraint
λ
u
2 is not binding and check the sign of df V 3. It is easy to recognize that, since V 3
3 is negative,
the “compensated” eﬀect of the conjectured reform on the indirect utility of individuals of
type 3 is positive if and only if
³
∂ e c2








< 0; in turn, this requirement means
that one of the following four conditions holds:
i) t>0,
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(where |•| denotes absolute values).
Regarding the conditions that make df V 3 < 0, we only give the one of them which will
be useful later on:
i
0) t<0,
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∂e c2
∂q
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
>
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∂e c3
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is bigger than zero, and denote situations starting from which a marginal increase in the
commodity tax rate raises the total tax liability of an individual of type 3 (high skilled, low
taste for leisure) more than the one of an individual of type 2 (high skilled, high taste for
leisure). Then the total tax liability of the type 3 individuals needs to be reduced and this
21is achieved by a (utility enhancing) reduction in their income tax liability (i.e. gross income
Y 3).
Conditions ii) and iv) instead characterize situations where a marginal increase in the
commodity tax rate weighs less upon an individual of type 3 than it does upon an individual
of type 2 since relatively more revenue is extracted from type 2 individuals. In order to
match the HE constraint it is now necessary to raise the total tax liability of the type 3
individuals. However, in this case the goal is achieved, counterintuitively, by a reduction
in gross income Y 3.I f1+tc3
3
αL
wH < 0, a marginal increase in Y 3 actually reduces total tax
r e v e n u ee v e ni ft h em a r g i n a lu n i to fi n c o m ei st a x e da ta1 0 0p e r c e n tr a t e .T h ee x p l a n a t i o n
is that demand is recomposed across consumption goods in a way which greatly reduces
indirect tax receipts. To raise the total tax payment of individuals of type 3, one has to
lower their gross income and rely on the positive net eﬀect working through the change in
their consumption pattern.
However, conditions ii) and iv) are mainly a curiosity, and can never hold at an interior
o p t i m u m . I tc a nb ep r o v e dt h a tt h e ya r ec o n ﬂicting with one of the ﬁrst order conditions
of the planner’s problem. To show this, take the derivative of the budget constraint of an












If commodities c and z are normal, from (23) we have 1−tc3
B > 0. A necessary condition
for eq. (C3) in Appendix C to be satisﬁed (remember that we are assuming λ
u











> 0 (since V 3
B > 0 and V 3
3 < 0), but if 1 − tc3





F i n a l l y ,i ti si n t e r e s t i n gt ol o o ka tc o n d i t i o n st h a tm a k eo u rm o d i ﬁed commodity tax









































































2 − d c3(2)
´
. (24)
In order to come back to eq. (4), λ
u
2 must be equal to zero and the term labelled by B on
the left-hand side of eq. (24) must vanish. To satisfy the latter requirement, one of the two


























Condition (25) says that, if the compensated response to a marginal price increase is the
same for agents of type 2 as it is for agents of type 3, then there is no additional scope for the
use of commodity taxation besides the standard one of weakening the binding self-selection
constraints.
























marginal disutility of gross income for an agent of type 3 (V 3
3 αL being the marginal disutility




the net eﬀect on the government’s revenue coming from a marginal increase in the gross
income Y 3, when the marginal unit of income is taxed away at a 100 percent rate, and
taking the reallocation of demand across consumption goods into account.
The left-hand side of eq. (27) represents the costs of raising an additional unit of revenue
by increasing the income tax liability of agents of type 3: in fact, a marginal increase in
23the gross income of these agents, holding constant their disposable income, has a total
direct negative impact on their indirect utility measured by π3V 3
3
αL
wH (since there are π3
agents of type 3), and as such it negatively aﬀects the objective function of the government;
moreover, since this policy change also tightens the self-selection constraint that prevents







The right-hand side of eq. (27) represents instead the beneﬁts of this policy measure:
this change raises total additional funds and, when evaluated at the shadow price for public








Condition (27) therefore says that we are also back to the standard formula for optimal
commodity taxation if the social beneﬁts of a marginal increase in the gross income Y 3 are
exactly oﬀset by its social costs.
Having interpreted eq. (16), the rule for the optimal commodity tax, and also having
clariﬁed some of the details of this rule, we are ready to state its novel properties in a
proposition. Following the proposition, we will discuss the intuition behind some of the
most interesting cases.
Proposition 1 At the constrained utilitarian optimum (with redistribution from high to low
skilled individuals), it is not always true that under the assumption αH
wH < αL
wL:
(a) a commodity that is complementary to leisure should be discouraged whereas a commodity
that is complementary to labor should be encouraged;
(b) a commodity that is normally expected to be encouraged should be subsidized whereas a
commodity that is normally expected to be discouraged should be taxed at a positive rate.
Proof. See Appendix D.
Proposition 1 clearly diﬀers from the popular prescription19 in the literature on opti-
mal taxation telling that goods complementary to labor should be encouraged while goods
complementary to leisure20 should be discouraged by the commodity tax system (whereas
19 See for example Edwards et al. (1994) and Stiglitz (1998).
20 Complementary to labour (leisure) is here used as a short for and corresponds to the deﬁnition by
Pollak (1969) of negatively related to leisure (labour).
24“encouraged” and “discouraged” are both intended in the Mirrleesian sense).21 In the stan-
dard22 counterpart of eq. (4) with many types of individuals and many commodities, this is
reﬂected in that the right-hand side, which provides a social evaluation of the gains from a
marginal (compensated) increase in one of the commodity tax rates in terms of relaxing the
binding incentive compatibility constraints, is positive (negative) if the commodity which
price is marginally increased by the tax is complementary to labor (leisure).
We have already observed that, when people diﬀer along more than one dimension, we
cannot invoke Proposition 6 by Guesnerie and Seade (1982), and say that the budget set will
be a simple monotonic chain to the left. In our model, the HE constraint together with the
assumption of redistribution from high- towards low skilled individuals (what we referred to
as the “normal” case) imply that the corner intended for the low skilled type 1 individuals
is L-linked (see footnote 12) to the corner intended for the high skilled but more epicurean
individuals of type 2. Regarding the relation between individuals of type 2 and 3, the corner
intended for type 2 can be L-linked to the corner intended for the high skilled hard working
type, or the corner intended for the high skilled hard working type 3 can be L-linked to the
one intended for type 2. This remark is part of the story why it is not necessarily expected
that a commodity that is complementary to labor should be encouraged or a commodity
that is complementary to leisure should be discouraged by the indirect tax system.
T h ef e a t u r ej u s tm e n t i o n e di ss h a r e db ya l lm od e l sw h e r et h eP a r e t o - e ﬃcient tax structure
doesn’t entail a simple monotonic chain to the left, but in our model a second peculiarity
stands out which is strictly related to the introduction of the HE constraint. Whereas in the
standard model with two private consumption goods, the term by which the commodity tax
21 In a general context where there are n commodities and m individuals, the index of discouragement of














,w h e r eq and t denote consumer
prices and commodity tax rates, xh
i is the demand for commodity i by individual h and a tilde denotes
hicksian demand. The index is an approximate measure of the change in compensated demand due to the
tax system; positive values of the index mean that the commodity is encouraged by the indirect tax system,
while negative values correspond to discouragement.
22 Standard is here meant to describe a situation where individuals diﬀer only with regard to their skill
level and wages are exogenous.
25rate t is multiplied is always negative (because of the concavity of the expenditure function),
here it is not possible to rule out the possibility that, due to the presence of two additional
factors (df V 3 and d
] [ V 2(3)) ,t h ea f o r e s a i dt e r mt u r n so u tt ob ep o s i t i v e .I nt h a tc a s ew eh a v e
the “anomalous” prescriptions that a commodity that according to the right-hand side of eq.
(16) should be encouraged, should in fact be taxed at a positive rate, whereas a commodity
that according to the right-hand side of eq. (16) should be discouraged, should be subsidized.
Referring once more to the case when λ
u
2 =0 , let us try to explain why a commodity that
is complementary to labor and that according to the right-hand side of eq. (16) should be
encouraged can nonetheless be taxed at a positive rate. Starting with a positive value of the
commodity tax rate, even if a decrease in the excise is beneﬁcial in terms of (compensated)
revenue and weakening of the self-selection constraints, the reduction is not realized because
the beneﬁts are more than oﬀset by the cost in terms of reduced indirect utility of individuals
of type 3 descending from the demand to keep the HE constraint satisﬁed, which would
require an increase in their gross income Y 3 (cf. condition i)). Similarly, a commodity that
is complementary to leisure and that also should be discouraged according to the right-
hand side of eq. (16) can nevertheless be subsidized. Starting with a negative value of
the commodity tax rate, even if an increase in the excise would be beneﬁcial in terms
of (compensated) revenue and weakening of the self-selection constraints, there will be no
increase because of the damaging eﬀect on the indirect utility of individuals of type 3 coming
from the increase in their gross income needed to maintain the HE constraint satisﬁed (cf.
condition i0)).
3.2.2 The Marginal Eﬀective Tax Rates
We now turn to the problem of evaluating the METR faced by the individuals at the optimal
allocation. Using eq. (8) we can characterize the METR in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Under the assumption αH
wH < αL
wL, the constrained utilitarian optimum with
redistribution from high to low skilled individuals is characterized by:
(a) a marginal eﬀective tax rate faced by type 1 (low skilled, low taste for leisure) that is
positive;
(b) a zero marginal eﬀective tax rate faced by either type 2 (high skilled, high taste for leisure)
26or type 3 (high skilled, low taste for leisure), and a marginal eﬀective tax rate diﬀerent from
zero for the other type.
Proof. See Appendix E.





















































































The positive METR faced by the low skilled individuals is not surprising if we notice
that the corner intended for the low skilled individuals is L-linked with another corner (the
one intended for high skilled, high taste for leisure individuals) by a downwards incentive
compatibility constraint and that this kind of distortion is the standard one which makes it
possible to relax the binding constraint in such a circumstance.
Regarding the high skilled individuals, we have already noticed that in this particular




3 a r eb i n d i n ga tt h es a m et i m e . S u p p o s eﬁrst
that λ
d
3 6=0while the other self-selection constraint is slack (λ
u
2 =0 ). From eq. (29) we
have τ0
3 =0 : the corner intended for type 3 (high skilled, low taste for leisure) individuals
is not L-linked to any other corner and they are “on average” undistorted at the margin.
From eq. (28), instead, we have that type 2 (high skilled, high taste for leisure) individuals
face a METR diﬀerent from zero. Considering the pattern of the binding self-selection
constraints (only downwards), we would expect that the sign of the METR faced by this
type of individuals were positive since this is the standard prescription for weakening the
binding constraints in such a case. However, still looking at eq. (28), this is not obvious













BαH > 0), the sign of the denominator
is instead ambiguous, implying that it is impossible to decide the sign of τ0
2 ap r i o r i .N o t i c e
27that, from the f.o.c. for B3 (see Appendix C, eq. (C3)), we have as a necessary condition for









2 =0 , the standard formula for the METR faced by individuals of type 2











3 αL and the magnitude and sign of
this term could reverse the overall sign of the expression. The reason why this is the case
is again connected to the requirement of HE. The point is that the sign of the METR faced
by individuals of type 2 determines the sign of the variation in their total tax liability as
they increase the labor supply; this in turn means that, if agents of type 2 should marginally
increase their labor supply, it would be necessary to adjust the gross income of individuals
of type 3 to have equal total tax payments, and this would obviously aﬀect their indirect
utility in a manner that the government must take into account. More formally, suppose
that individuals of type 2 choose to marginally increase their gross income Y 2.I no r d e rt o
be induced to do so, their disposable income has to be increased by their marginal valuation
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Other things being equal, dY 3 > (<)0 is welfare damaging (beneﬁcial) for individuals
of type 3 since it means less (more) leisure, and therefore the only way to get a solution
entailing τ0
2 < 0 is that the encouragement of labor supply provided by the marginal subsidy
is coupled by an increase in the indirect utility of individuals of type 3, obtained by a




Suppose instead that τ0
2 > 0. This means that, if individuals of type 2 are willing to
marginally increase their labor supply, their total tax liability will increase as well. In order
not to violate the HE constraint, an increase in the total tax liability paid by individuals
of type 3 is also required, and this is obtained by increasing Y 3 (remember that, when
λ
u
2 =0 , 1+tc3
3
αL
wH > 0 is a necessary condition for the existence of a solution of the
planner’s problem). This variation (dY 3 > 0) is detrimental to their welfare and tightens
28the binding self-selection constraint λ
d
3. Eq. (28) says that in this case the METR faced by












3 αL is absent, in order to prevent them from being tempted to increase
their labor supply.
Suppose now that λ
u
2 6=0whereas it is the incentive compatibility constraint that prevents
i n d i v i d u a l so ft y p e3t om i m i ct h o s eo ft y p e2t h a ti ss l a c k( λ
d
3 =0 ). From eq. (28) we
have τ0
2 =0 : now it is the corner intended for individuals with high taste for leisure that
is not L-linked to any other corner and they should therefore be “on average” undistorted
at the margin. According to eq. (29), the METR faced by the high skilled, low taste for
leisure individuals is instead diﬀerent from zero, coherent with the rule prescribing that an
individual should be “on average” distorted at the margin when the bundle intended for
him is L-linked to another bundle by individuals of a diﬀerent type. However, whereas we
would normally expect a marginal (“on average”) subsidy when the self-selection constraint
is binding upwards, in this case the sign is ambiguous.
W i t ho b v i o u sn o t a t i o nw ec a ne x p r e s st h eM E T Rf a c e db yt y p e3i n d i v i d u a l si nam o r e
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wH < 0 and
d[ V 2(3)
dB3 < 0= ⇒ τ
0
3 > 0.
Case i∗):s i n c e1+tc3
3
αL








> 0 (remember that we proved 1−t ∂c3
∂B3 > 0);
this means that a marginal increase in the labor supply of type 3 individuals (in this case
the ones being potentially mimicked) would be coupled with an increase in their disposable
income in order to satisfy constraint (9). However we also have that d\ V 2(3)
dB3 > 0, i.e. the
mimickers would proﬁt by the change. In order to prevent this and weaken the binding self-
selection constraint it is appropriate to have individuals of type 3 facing a positive distortion
at the margin, discouraging them from increasing their labor supply.
Case ii∗):s i n c e1+tc3
3
αL








< 0; this means that a marginal increase in
the labor supply of individuals of type 3 would be coupled with a reduction in their disposable
income in order to maintain constraint (9) satisﬁed. However we also have that d\ V 2(3)
dB3 > 0,
i.e. the mimickers would be damaged by the change. In order to exploit this opportunity
and weaken the binding self-selection constraint, it is appropriate to have individuals of type
3 facing a negative distortion (a subsidy) at the margin, encouraging them to increase their
labor supply.
Case iii∗):a g a i n1+tc3
3
αL








> 0: a marginal increase in the labor
supply of individuals of type 3 would be coupled with an increase in their disposable income
in order to maintain constraint (9) satisﬁed. However, opposite to case i∗),w ea l s oh a v e
that d\ V 2(3)
dB3 < 0, i.e. the mimickers would be harmed by the change. In order to exploit the
chance to relax the binding self-selection constraint it is appropriate to have individuals of
type 3 facing a negative METR, encouraging them to increase their labor supply.
Case iv∗):a g a i n1+tc3
3
αL








< 0: this means that a marginal
increase in the labor supply of individuals of type 3 would be coupled with a reduction
in their disposable income in order to keep constraint (9) satisﬁed. However, opposite to
case ii∗) we also have that d\ V 2(3)
dB3 < 0, i.e. the mimickers would proﬁtb yt h ec h a n g e . I n
order to prevent this and weaken the binding self-selection constraint it is appropriate to
have individuals of type 3 facing a positive METR, discouraging them from increasing their
30supply of labor.
4 Concluding Remarks
Our aim with this paper has not been to make an ethical case for the horizontal equity
principle. As argued by Kaplow (1995), although horizontal equity is intuitively appealing,
there is need for studies that try both to justify this principle and to derive a precise measure
of equity from the justiﬁcation. Our intentions have rather been to investigate how the
preferred tax mix might change if we were to take horizontal equity seriously.
The investigation has made clear that the horizontal equity principle may seriously aﬀect
the incentives for income and commodity taxation. The basic intuition and policy impli-
cations from models with heterogeneity in ability may not carry over into models where
preferences for leisure are heterogeneous as well. Contrary to normal ﬁndings, our results
indicate that a good that is complementary to leisure need not be discouraged by the tax
system, and a good that is normally expected to be discouraged need not be taxed even if the
economy is composed by only two private goods and leisure. As expected, the direction of re-
distribution is a crucial factor for the marginal eﬀective tax rates, but the introduction of the
horizontal equity restriction complicates matters here as well. It is for instance possible to
have a marginal tax instead of a subsidy “on average” for the high ability, hard working-type
even though the self-selection constraint relating them to the high ability, epicurean-type is
binding upwards.
Before concluding, we note some possible objections against our model. Since the indi-
viduals are held responsible for their preferences, a higher taste for leisure can in our model
be interpreted as laziness. Obviously there are several alternative interpretations. Cuﬀ
(2000) discusses the alternative to interpret a high taste for leisure as a kind of disability.
Possibly, her interpretation leads to very diﬀerent implications. Whereas it is intuitive to
argue that compensation for laziness should be ruled out, it is–at least in the framework
of responsibility and compensation–less obvious that people who are for some other reason
unable to work as hard as others, should not receive any compensation for this disability.
31The discussion clearly touches upon the concept of free will and whether preferences are to
be treated as given or as acquired. It would be presumptuous to try to answer such questions
in passing–we conﬁne ourselves to saying that besides the beneﬁts associated with a focus
on one of the polar cases, our ﬁn d i n g sa r ea l s or e l e v a n ta sl o n ga st h et a s t ef o rl e i s u r ea m o n g
some individuals is to some extent interpreted more as laziness than as a disability.
Moreover, the economic analysis of the family (Becker, 1991; Cigno, 1991) can be used to
explain why certain individuals are less prone to work longer hours. If production of certain
goods and services can take place at home, individuals who are relatively more productive
at home than at work will act as if they had a greater taste for leisure. Home production
could mean the producing of substitutes to services available on the market as in Kleven et
al. (2000), or it could be child rearing as in Balestrino et al. (2002). Apart from explaining
why the labor market has a greater appeal to certain individuals, these studies also narrow
down the set of goods that are candidates for relatively higher taxes. Almost ﬁfty years ago,
Corlett and Hague (1953) suggested that eﬃciency could be improved by taxing goods that
are complementary to leisure more heavily. Yet their rule has not come to much use since
the relation between most goods and leisure is wrapped in mystery. This lack of information
is of course just as problematic in models like ours. Therefore models with home production
provide promising inputs to extensions of our model which aim at more practically oriented
policy implications.
To conclude, although our model is very simple and stylized, we hope that we have
called attention to the relevance and some potential consequences of a horizontal equity
restriction for tax policy. Without doubt there are prospects for more research in this
relatively unexplored area of tax theory.
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365 Appendix A: Derivation of eq. (4)














































































































































































































































































































By using the Slutsky equation and by some further manipulation, one ﬁnally gets eq.
(4).
6 Appendix B: The Marginal Eﬀective Tax Rates
The ﬁrst order conditions of the planner’s problem with respect to gross incomes Y 1, Y 2



























































































































Using notation w1 = wL
αL, w2 = wH
αH , w3 = wH





























38Since assumption 2 implies that Ω1,2 < 1, and single-crossing holds, the METR faced by
type 1 is positive.
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which again gives a positive value for τ0
2.
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7 Appendix C: Derivation of eq. (16)















































































































































































































































































































B =0 . (C4)































































































































































































































































































































































By using the Slutsky equation and by some further manipulation, one ﬁnally gets eq.
(16).
418 Appendix D: Proof of Proposition 1
In eq. (16) the following four main cases are possible:
Case 1: RHS > 0,t > 0,γ π 1 ∂ e c1















^ \ V 2(3)
t > 0;
Case 2: RHS > 0,t < 0,γ π 1 ∂ e c1















^ \ V 2(3)
t < 0;
Case 3: RHS < 0,t > 0,γ π 1 ∂ e c1















^ \ V 2(3)
t < 0;
Case 4: RHS < 0,t < 0,γ π 1 ∂ e c1















^ \ V 2(3)
t > 0,
where RHS is used to denote the right hand side of eq. (16).
For (a), note that the sign of the right hand side is not determined ap r i o r iby the relation
of the taxed commodity to labor or leisure. If the taxed commodity is complementary to




2 > 0,c a s e3
encompasses a “non-ordinary” sub-case with a commodity complementary to labor which in
spite of this is taxed at a positive rate, besides the standard case of subsidizing a commodity
which is complementary to labor. If the taxed commodity is instead complementary to
leisure we have that c1 < d c2(1), c3 > d c2(3),a n dc2 < d c3(2). Thus, case 2 encompasses a
“non-ordinary” sub-case with a commodity complementary to leisure which in spite of this
is subsidized. Those two “non-ordinary” sub-cases demonstrate that a good that is normally
expected to be discouraged (encouraged) in order to loosen the self-selection constraints,
may actually be encouraged (discouraged) in a model where the agents diﬀer along more
than one dimension.
For (b), consider in case 1 the sub-case of a commodity complementary to labor that
should be encouraged, according to the right hand side of eq. (16); nevertheless, due to











^ \ V 2(3)
t which is greater than the absolute value of
γπ1 ∂ e c1




πi, the commodity is taxed. Similarly, consider in case 4 the sub-case of
a commodity complementary to leisure that should be discouraged, according to the right
42hand side of eq. (16). The commodity is nonetheless subsidized since also in this instance
the requirement to uphold horizontal equity implies that the term that multiplies t on the
left hand side of eq. (16) turns out to be positive. However, whilst in the former sub-case






df V 3 − λ
u
2d
] [ V 2(3) (since we are looking
conditions compatible with a tax), in the latter sub-case this requirement means a high and
negative value of the aforesaid term (since we are looking for conditions compatible with a








¯ ¯ ¯ must be satisﬁed
in both of these sub-cases.
¥
9 Appendix E: Proof of Proposition 2
Considering the “normal” case when redistribution is directed towards the low skilled indi-
viduals and λ
u
1 =0 ,t h eﬁrst order conditions of the planner’s problem with respect to gross





















































































wH =0 . (E2)





















































































































Using notation w1 = wL
αL, w2 = wH
αH , w3 = wH




























Since assumption 2 implies that Ω1,2 < 1, and single-crossing holds, the METR faced by
type 1 is positive.
For (b), we ﬁrst need expressions for the METR faced by type 2 and 3. Starting with type
































































































































































































































































































































































































































2, which enter the expressions
for τ0
2 and τ0
3 multiplicatively, are both binding or slack at the same time, part (b) of the
proposition follows from eq. (E8) and (E10).
¥
45